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EARLY WARNING SIGNALS OF THE 2000/2001 TURKISH 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Ali Arı*, Rüstem Dağtekin**
ABSTRACT 
The 2000/2001 Turkish crisis was one of the most impressive crises that 
hit the emerging market economies in the late 90s. The characteristic of 
this crisis is not only its violence but also its suddenness. We observe two 
rapid crisis sequences which are different from recent financial crisis 
examples. The analysis of the Turkish crisis in the literature generally 
presents an analytical aspect that only relates the stylized facts of the 
crisis omitting a strong econometric basis. This paper goes further: it 
presents two models (OLS and Logit) which will test the implication level 
of the macroeconomic and financial variables in the outbreak of the 
crisis.  
Keywords: Currency Crisis, Banking System Fragility, Third Generation 
Crisis Model, Turkey 
EARLY WARNING SIGNALS OF THE 2000/2001 TURKISH 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INTRODUCTION 
The last decade of the 20th century was marked by a new wave of 
international financial crises, thus weakening the world economy. Europe 
underwent the crisis of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 
1992/1993. It was at the end of 1994 a crisis hit the Mexican economy. It 
spread to the neighbouring economies, called later “tequila effect”. In the 
summer of 1997, the devaluation of the Thai baht induced a chain 
reaction in many Asian economies. This unexpected and unforeseen 
phenomenon by the economic analysis touched Southeast Asian 
emerging markets (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines), 
then contaminated the newly industrialized countries (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan) and spread to South Korea, which is a quasi-
industrialized country. One speaks then of a contagion effect which 
touches countries that do not have financial or even macroeconomic 
imbalances, and of systemic risk putting in danger the whole 
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international financial system. Then, the 1998 Russian crisis was the 
most spectacular. Indeed, the Russian rouble was depreciated of more 
than 250%, the Russian State was almost insolvent and it was the first 
time that a literature appeared about the bankruptcy of a state. Finally, 
the Brazilian crisis hit at the beginning of 1999. These last two crises had 
a common point defined by their tendency to spread to neighbouring 
economies. 
The beginning of the 2000s reminds us that financial instability is a 
stylized fact requiring a more amplified study. The 2001 Argentinean 
crisis was due to mismanagement of economic policies which led to 
unsustainable sovereign debt. It was in February 2001 that a financial 
crisis hit the Turkish economy. This crisis was certainly due to the failure 
of the banking sector and the deterioration of macroeconomic 
fundamentals, but was triggered by rumours of political instability. The 
crisis led to depreciation of the Turkish lira more than 70% and the 
decline of the GNP more than 8%.  
Each one of these crises has a characteristic which defines it, so 
the generalization of an economic model to explain all these different 
cases is not possible in our sense. It would thus be necessary to 
distinguish the remedies according to the sources of the crisis, i.e. to 
consider solutions at the scale of a country or to restrict the application 
field to a group of economically homogeneous countries. However, all 
these crises present a key feature of the new international financial 
markets structure of the 80s and 90s, which is liberalization of capital 
flows. From then on currency problems have not necessarily come from 
the deteriorated economic fundamentals, but they may also appear 
through much more volatile capital flows. Indeed, countries have not had 
control over this determinant variable and the implemented economic 
policies need to take this into account. 
Our analysis consists in developing a crisis indicator which will 
measure the vulnerability of a country towards an external shock initiated 
by a massive capital inflow and/or outflow. We present here a linear 
regression model and a binary regression model that will test the 
implication level of the macroeconomic and financial variables in the 
outbreak of the crisis. The aim of this study is to determine the indicators 
that precipitated the Turkish crisis. 
This paper is composed of six sections. After the introduction, the 
second section will present the stylized facts of the 2000/2001 Turkish 
financial crisis. The third one will present a review of theoretical and 
empirical literature on crises. The fourth one will define the models and 
their variables. The estimation results of the models will be analyzed in 
the fifth section, and the last one will conclude and bring some remarks. 
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THE 2000/2001 TURKISH FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Turkey entered the new millennium with a stabilization program 
anchored on a basket of currencies (American dollar and Euro). This 
program which pre-announced the exchange rate parity was supported 
by the IMF stand-by credits. The country undertook to decrease the 
inflation rate to 25% in 2000 then to 12% in 2001. The program was 
also accompanied by a restrictive budgetary and monetary policy, which 
enabled the Central Bank to increase the domestic liquidity only with 
capital inflows, giving the program a currency board character. 
The program found a positive echo among economic agents: the 
capital inflows accelerated (15.2 billion USD in 2000), the interest rates 
strongly decreased (from more than 80% to about 40%), and the 
consumption sharply increased in particular with low cost bank credits1. 
However, the rigidity of the inflation to fall, especially because of the 
sharp increase of consumption mainly met by importations, led to an 
overvaluation of the Turkish lira (about 15%) compared to the pre-
announced parity of the fixed exchange rate, which deteriorated in turn 
the trade balance (deficit of 27 billion USD at the end of 2000) and the 
current account balance (deficit of 9.8 billion USD, 4.9% of the GDP). 
Besides, the rise of the short-term debt associated to the failure to 
achieve the privatization goals increased the tensions in the Turkish 
money market and created doubts on the sustainability of the program. 
The international investors became then increasingly reluctant in 
renewing their credits, which increased the domestic interest rates and 
their volatility. Furthermore, the strong exposure of the banking system 
to currency and interest rate mismatches, and to credit and default risks 
enhanced these doubts. At the end of October 2000, Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund (SDIF) took control over two small-scale banks (Etibank, 
Bank Kapital), which put out rumours on the insolvency of Demirbank, 
because the latter was the sixth leading bank in the country and above 
all the partner of Etibank. These events emphasized the tensions in the 
Turkish financial system and raised the interest rates at the beginning of 
November. 
During the same time, as they do it each year, banks started to 
cover their short currency positions in order to strike their balance sheets 
at the end of the year. This accelerated the demand for liquidity and 
increased again the interest rates, weakening more the illiquid banks 
which began distress sales of their Treasury bonds in order to have 
liquidity. On November 20th, as the rumours on the illiquid banks were 
spread, the leading banks suspended their credit lines to the interbank 
market. The interest rates skyrocketed (overnight rate about 4000%) and 
the foreign investors started to leave the country. This was the beginning 
of the banking system liquidity crisis. In order to protect the banking 
                                                 
1 See Akyuz and Boratav (2001), “The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis”. 
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sector and to limit the rise of the interest rates, the Central Bank 
suspended its currency board commitment and bailed out the illiquid 
banks. However, the operators were reassured only on December 6th, 
with the IMF’s Supplemental Reserve Facility2 of 7.5 billion USD. On the 
same day, the SDIF took control over Demirbank, main source of the 
liquidity problems in the Turkish banking system.  
Nevertheless, the strong deterioration of the financial structure of 
the public banks and the SDIF banks and their massive requirements for 
short-term credits increased again the interest rates that led operators to 
question the sustainability of the fixed exchange system. Actually, it was 
the rumours of political instability that triggered the second shock. The 
country underwent a strong speculative attack against its currency and 
was forced to let it float. The currency crisis worsened in turn the already 
started banking liquidity crisis. Here is an example of so-called twin crises 
a la Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).  
The analysis of the Turkish financial crisis confirms mainly new 
crisis approaches by referring on the one hand to animal spirits and 
sunspots, on the other hand to the fragility and inefficiency of the 
banking system. Whereas the macroeconomic fundamentals of the 
country did not justify a crisis of such scale, the financial crisis started up 
with a rumour. Indeed, the speculative attack on the Turkish lira started, 
on February 19th 2001, with the disagreement between the Prime 
Minister and the President of the Republic, which was perceived by 
financial markets as a signal of political instability. The days following this 
scene were crucial in the country’s crisis management, because Turkey 
defended the fixed exchange rate parity by mobilization of its reserve 
stocks (5 billion USD in three days) and increase of the nominal interest 
rates to 8000% (overnight rate). But following the investors’ generalized 
distrust, the authorities were forced to let the currency float, on February 
22nd, 2001. In only one day, the Turkish lira depreciated of more than 
35% against the USD and lost 70% of its value until April 20013. 
Indeed, the rumours of political instability triggered the speculative 
attack against Turkish lira but it was the total inefficiency of the Turkish 
banking system that drove it4. Actually, the banks do have an essential 
role in the economic organization, because they are in the centre of the 
monetary circuits and manage the payments system. Moreover, they 
occupy a central place in the mobilization and the distribution of the 
savings. Hence, their structure is a significant source of systemic risk, 
 
2 IMF’s Supplemental Reserve Facility is a sort of short-term credit granted to the 
countries which suffer balance of payments problems and/or currency crises. 
3 See Arı (2003), Dağtekin (2002b) and Uygur (2001) for an amplified study on 
the stylized facts of the 2000-2001 Turkish financial crisis. 
4 See Ozatay and Sak (2003) who confirm the relationship between the Turkish 
banking sector fragility and the outbreak of the 2000-2001 Turkish crisis. The 
authors also present an amplified study on the reasons of the Turkish banking 
system vulnerability.  
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thus weakness and/or inefficiency of the banking sector can create a risk 
for the whole financial system and even for the entire economy. This is 
why effective regulation and supervision are necessary so that the banks 
can carefully lead their operations and have enough capital stocks in 
order to face the inherent risks of their functions, particularly in the 
context of financial liberalization (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1997). 
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Figure 1: Nominal Exchange Rate 
It was not the case of the Turkish banking sector which suffered 
some structural weaknesses in an unstable economic environment where 
the high rate of inflation (about 70% of annual average rate) and the 
fluctuations of the economic growth rate, by increasing uncertainties, 
contributed to the shortening of the maturities in the economy and to the 
increase of the interest rates (see Figure 2). In that environment, default 
risk was high for banks, because high interest rates deteriorated the non-
financial institutions balance sheets, which degraded then the quality of 
banks loans. 
The public sector’s deficits were another handicap of the Turkish 
economy, because the financing of these deficits by the high real interest 
rates on the domestic money market incited banks to offset these deficits 
instead of granting credits to the private sector. In this context banks got 
into debt in foreign currency with the international financial markets in 
order to invest in the public sector securities in domestic currency, which 
generated a strong growth of the domestic banks short positions. 
The great part of the State banks in the sector created negative 
effects on the entire system. The interventions of the political authorities 
in their management and the use of their assets to finance public deficits 
and doubtful projects of investors that were close to the political 
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authorities decreased their performances and deteriorated their balance 
sheets (duty losses of 21 billion USD at the end of 2000). Their massive 
borrowing requirement increased the instability of the financial system. 
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Ibank: Interbank interest rate 
Ibond: Treasury bond rate 
I3: Three-month interest rate 
Figure 2: Interest Rates in the Turkish Economy (%) 
In the context of full deposit insurance after the 1994 currency 
crisis, the moral hazard was inevitable, thus deteriorating the market 
discipline in the banking system. This structure encouraged banks and 
their depositors to take excessive risks in order to obtain higher profits. 
Furthermore, the lack of a Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(BRSA) independent of the political authorities until September 2000 
prevented an effective control on the banks operations and structures.  
All these features led to a weak and fragile banking system in 
Turkey. Moreover, the implementation of the stabilization program at the 
beginning of 2000 emphasized these weaknesses. Like in the several 
emerging market crises, the excessive short-term capital inflows 
weakened first the Turkish financial system before being at the origin of 
the crisis when a reversal of capital flows occurred. In the context of 
excessive capital inflows, the Turkish economy had a credit boom, in 
particular to consumption, financed by domestic banks. However, this 
credit growth made them more vulnerable to credit risks by increasing 
the part of non-performing loans in their assets portfolios. Furthermore, 
in the context of the fixed exchange system, banks were encouraged to 
borrow in short-term foreign currency on the international financial 
markets in order to invest in long-term domestic securities, which 
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brought them higher profits. As Figure 3 shows, the banks short positions 
rose far during the year 20005.  
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Figure 3: Short Position of the Turkish Banking System  
               (millions $) 
THE REVIEW OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
As we stated above, the last decade of the 20th century and the 
beginning of the 2000s were marked by a new wave of international 
financial crises. In this context, the crisis literature has become 
considerable on the specification of theoretical crisis models on the one 
hand and on the econometric estimation of early warning signals on the 
other hand.  
Following the first wave of currency crises, in particular those that 
came out in Latin America in the late 70s and early 80s, the first models 
of currency crises were developed by Krugman (1979) and Flood and 
Garber (1984). In the early crisis models, so-called first generation crisis 
models6, currency crises are associated to persistent economic 
imbalances (large and growing fiscal deficits and/or gradual growth of 
domestic credit) that are in conflict with a fixed exchange rate system. 
The monetization of this persistent fiscal deficit leads to loss of foreign 
                                                 
5 See Alper and Onis (2003), Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (2002), 
and Banks Association of Turkey (2001) for an amplified analysis of the Turkish 
banking system. 
6 For a detailed analysis of the generation of currency crises, see Eichengreen et 
al. (1994 and 1995), and Flood and Marion (1998). 
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main insufficient in 
explai
eak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 led to a 
reorie
exchange reserves of the government in a fixed exchange rate regime. 
When the level of reserves reaches a critical threshold, operators 
anticipating that the exchange rate is no longer viable, withdraw from the 
domestic currency in order not to suffer losses of a possible devaluation. 
The deteriorated macroeconomic fundamentals resulting from the 
economic policy inconsistency with the fixed exchange rate regime lead 
to investors’ generalized distrust towards the domestic currency and their 
"rational" reaction triggers a currency crisis. In that model, a speculative 
attack advances the date of onset of the crisis, but the crisis would 
outbreak even in its absence at a time of exhaustion of foreign exchange 
reserves of the government. Here, one suggests that some variables like 
large fiscal deficits, growth in domestic credit and depletion of reserves 
may be used as potential early warning indicators. 
However, the first generation models re
ning the ERM crises in 1992-1993 and Mexico crisis in 1994. New 
models were created, in particular by Obstfeld (1994, 1997) so-called 
second generation models, where a crisis can be triggered without ex 
ante significant deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals. Therefore, 
even if economic policies are consistent with the fixed exchange regime, 
a speculative attack may occur when a shift realizes in the operators’ 
expectations whose herd behaviour leads to a currency crisis. Unlike the 
first generation models that describe a simple and mechanical behaviour 
of policymakers against a speculative attack, the optimizing behaviour of 
the latter is central to the process of crisis in the second generation 
models. Because, in these models economic policies are not 
predetermined, but respond to the problems of the economy that 
operators are aware of. So we are in a configuration of multiple equilibria 
in which the agents’ expectations are not related to the macroeconomic 
fundamentals observed in period (t), but to the expected continuity of 
the government's policies in terms of the sustainability of the situation in 
(t+1) and of the loss function of government. Expectations are therefore 
based on the future direction of economic policy that is not 
predetermined but responds to the loss function of the government and 
to the future development of the economy. This circularity creates 
multiple equilibria which lead to the manifestation of self-fulfilling crises. 
In these models the exact timing of the crisis is unpredictable comparing 
to the first generation models. But even here we can identify if a country 
is in a zone of vulnerability, called later as “crisis zone” by Jeanne (1997), 
where some fundamentals are sufficiently weak that a shift in operators’ 
expectations – generally triggered by sunspot dynamics – could bring a 
crisis. 
The outbr
ntation of the crisis modelling (third generation crisis models). 
Currency crises do not only result of an unsustainable macroeconomic 
situation and/or of self-fulfilling prophecies, but can also be associated to 
the fragility of the banking and financial system. Of course, before the 
 198
Early Warning Signals of the 2000/2001 Turkish Financial Crisis 
Asian crisis, a number of macroeconomic fundamentals had already 
weakened as the deterioration of the current account deficit, overvalued 
currencies in the region, slowing export revenues, however, as stated 
Krugman (1999), this situation was not new. So the fragility of the 
banking and financial system led to currency crises in Southeast Asia in a 
destabilized economic environment. We can also see the important 
impact of the Turkish banking fragility on the outbreak of the 2000-2001 
Turkish crisis as we discussed in the previous section. We take into 
account that characteristic in making of our twin crisis index in the next 
section. 
Beside the theoretical models that tended to explain crisis 
mecha
 present a bivariate 
“signal
nism, several empirical studies have focused on the anticipation of 
the crises (early warning signals) that may give policymakers and 
investors alarms that a crisis is likely to occur. Four approaches have 
been adopted for creating early warning systems. 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998)
s” approach. They aim to monitor whether some “key” variables 
tend to behave unusually prior to the onset of a crisis. They define, albeit 
in an arbitrary method, an “optimal” threshold for each indicator which is 
calculated to minimize the noise-to-signal ratio; i.e. the ratio of false 
signals to good signals. Therefore, when an indicator crosses beyond a 
given threshold level, it issues a signal which is taken as a warning signal 
about a possible currency crisis within a specified period of time (24 
moths). An indicator jtX  becomes a signal jtS  which defines the 
condition of the transition rom a non-crisis state (0) to a crisis state (1) 
in a following manner: 
1
f
jtS = jt jX T≥  , if 
0jtS = , otherwise     (1) 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) examine the performance of each individual 
indica
 Crisis within 24 No crisis within 24 
tor based on the following matrix. 
months months 
Signal was issued A B 
No Signal was issued C D 
S 998, 28. 
Here, A represents the number of months in which an indicator 
issued
did not correctly issue any signal. 
ource: Kaminsky et al. 1
 a good signal, B represents the number of months in which an 
indicator signalled a crisis where there was no crisis in reality, C is the 
number of months in which an indicator failed to signal a crisis which 
actually occurred, and D is the number of months in which an indicator 
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le picture of problems of the economy 
by sho
more than 100 developing countries. It consists in 
regres
 as 
An important advantage of the signals approach is to give 
policymakers an easily interpretab
wing clearly which indicators exceed the calculated threshold level. 
However, we lose some information when we set threshold levels. For 
example, an indicator does not give any signal even though it derives 
unusually from its trend, because it is just below the threshold. Or once 
an indicator crosses the threshold, we cannot observe how deteriorated 
an indicator is. 
Frankel and Rose (1996) use a large multi-country sample 
composed of 
sing a probit model in which the dependent variable is the crisis 
indicator based on the exchange market pressure index and the 
independent variables are economic and financial indicators, mostly the 
same as those used in Kaminsky et al.’s signal-based approach.  
The probit or logit approach has been also used in Eichengreen, 
Rose and Wyplosz (1994). These two papers estimate the equation
( ) ( )'tprob C t k t kF X β− −Ω =
where F is a cumulative distribution 
     (2) 
function, t kX −  is a vector of lagged 
early warning indicators, and Ct is a binary crisi  as an 
index of speculative pressure (ISP) (Abiad, 1999). One suggests that a 
crisis occurs when ISP exceeds an arbitrary thresholdT : 
1tC
s variable defined
= , if tISP T≥  
0tC = tISP T<, if      (3) 
This m  has the
each variable on the crisis probability. In addition, it considers all 
variab
of the “tequila effect” following the 
Mexica
odel  advantage of measuring the direct effect of 
les together and looks only at the marginal contributions of each 
indicator. However, measures of statistical significance cannot distinguish 
if an indicator is good at signalling crises or sending false alarms (Abiad, 
1999). Moreover, the use of annual data may restrict the applicability of 
this approach as an early warning system, while it allows the analysis of 
some variables available in this frequency, such as the composition of 
external debt (Berg & Pattillo, 1998). 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) define a "Cross-country" 
approach trying to explain the impact 
n crisis of December 1994. Their approach consists in finding the 
countries that will be most hit by a crisis appeared in a region. The 
method is based on a crisis indicator calculated over a stress period on 
the international markets. Therefore, they limit their cross-country 
sample to 20 countries which seem to have some similarities for one year 
period of 1995. Their approach differs then from the first two studies 
discussed above which integrate in their samples a large number of 
countries with different episodes of crises. We can claim the first two 
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approaches are based on an assumption that all crises can be explained 
in the same way while ignoring some geographic and local characteristics 
and also conjectural and periodical specificities. It should then lower the 
number of crises episodes to analyse over a shorter period of time with a 
smaller number of variables that Sachs et al. (1996) use as a method. 
However, their approach fails to shed light on the timing of the 
speculative attacks, but rather allows answering which countries are most 
likely to suffer a crisis due to an external shock.  
Another method more contemporary at least in its use is to 
establish an early warning system by using Markov-switching models 
(Peria, 1999; Abiad, 1999, 2003). Abiad (1999, 2003) models a classic 
Y variable which measures the probability of transition from a non-crisis 
state in (t) to a crisis state in (t+1).  
( )2,iidt t s sY s N t tμ σ?      (4) 
This process follow t ts a two-state Markov chain { }Ts  with 1s =  t1=
when crisis occurs and 0ts =  otherwise.  
This method is appr modelli
sudden, fluctuating an tal behaviou
opriate for ng variables which present 
d bru r, such as the dynamics of 
financ
ynamic OLS and logit models. Our contribution is to 
includ
 Kose (2006). They 
use d
ial crises. Another advantage of these models lies on avoiding 
many ad hoc assumption used in early models like setting arbitrary 
thresholds for indicators or for the definition of crisis episodes. However, 
beside the technical difficulty of Markov-switching models with time-
varying probabilities which are still not part of standard econometric 
software packages, these models present another difficulty in testing a 
null of no switching. 
Our approach is to set an early warning system for the 2000-2001 
Turkish crisis using d
e a large number of indicators with monthly data and to model a 
binary endogenous variable, more sophisticated, which produces more 
accurate results than a study based on a classic ISP that we tested in a 
previous paper (Arı & Dağtekin, 2006). Our sample is composed of 215 
monthly observations being spread out from January 1987 to December 
2004. These data were collected from the IMF [International Financial 
Statistics, IFS (January 2006)], the World Bank [World Development 
Indicators, (2005)] and the Central Bank of Turkey7. 
Other empirical paper – as far as we know – that studied the case 
of the Turkish 2000-2001 crisis is that of Cepni and
ynamic logit and probit models for predicting currency crises 
probabilities by modelling a classic ISP a la Eichengreen, Rose, and 
Wyplosz (1995) of 4.04σ . They create a sample of 11 macroeconomic 
                                                 
7 www.tcmb.gov.tr 
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THE MODELS 
In order to explain ou ariable, we built a series of 
indicators taken from the financial literature to measure the vulnerability 
of an
ignals approach for the 2000/2001 Turkish financial crisis. 
Secon
variables in quarterly frequency that remain in our sense insufficient to 
explain the 2000-2001 Turkish crisis which presents a high vulnerability 
of the financial system in its occurrence as we displayed in the previous 
section. 
r endogenous v
 economy to speculative attacks. Following Eichengreen et al. 
(1995), Sachs et al. (1996), or Cartapanis, Dropsy and Mametz (1998, 
2002), Dağtekin (2002a), Abiad (1999, 2003), and Arı and Dağtekin 
(2006, 2007), the first part of our crisis indicator is made of real 
exchange rate changes, international reserves changes and real interest 
rate changes.  
This paper brings a double contribution. First, it implements an 
early warning s
dly, it develops an original new generation crisis indicator that 
combines the macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions of the 
crisis. Indeed, the third generation currency crises associate the 
weakness of economic fundamentals to the fragility of the financial 
system, in particular to the fragility of the banking sector. This is why the 
second part of our crisis indicator refers to three risk measures of the 
banking system that can easily be found in the literature under different 
forms, but also under an aggregated form in Kibritcioğlu (2002), defined 
as the banking sector fragility indicator. 
Our crisis index appears then in the following way: 
 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎛ loglog ttt rRESRER⎜⎜⎝
+−=
−−− 111 loglog ttt rRESRER
Itwin σσt
( ) ( ) ( ) tt
t
t
t
t
t
DEPO
DEPO
FXLIAB
FXLIAB
CPS
CPS εσσσ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −++
−−− 111 log
log
log
log
log
log
 (5) 
 
where ( )* /RER NER P P= ×  
RER= Real exchange rate (an increase corresponds to a real 
depreciation of the domestic currency) 
00 = 1995) 
= C
NER= Nominal exchange rate (TL/USD) 
*P = Consumer prices index US (base 1
P onsumer prices index Turkey (base 100 = 1995) 
RES = International reserves – Gold (in USD) 
r = real interest rate (deflated by the inflation rate to the 
consumption of the domestic country) 
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CPS = Claims on private sector (in TL) 
FXLIAB= Foreign exchange liabilities (in USD) 
DEPO= Total deposits (in TL) 
σ = Stan
Th  the market pressure or 
speculative pressure as defined by Eichengreen et al. (1995). The crisis 
indica
ability to combine microeconomic and 
macro
ors used in the models 
are gathered in the below tables with their expected impacts on the crisis 
index. 
dard deviation of the variables 
e first part of the equation measures
tor increases with a depreciation of the domestic exchange rate, 
with a significant fall of the Central Bank international reserves and with 
a considerable rise of the real interest rate. The second part of our 
equation measures the vulnerability of the domestic banking system. The 
crisis indicator increases with an increasing credit amount to the private 
sector granted by the banking sector, with a considerable rise of the 
banking system foreign exchange liabilities and with a significant fall of 
the banking system deposits.  
Our indicator called Itwin (twin crisis indicator) can be debatable 
as for the economic accept
economic spheres. However, our choice is confirmed by the reality 
of the Turkish crisis, which would never have occurred if the banking 
system had not been weakened, because macroeconomic fundamentals 
were already deteriorated since 1999 in spite of the IMF strong backing. 
The Figure 4 can give an idea about the aspect of the crisis indicator. 
Thus, our analysis will be based and directed by this curve which enables 
to detect the peaks of crisis undergone by the Turkish economy. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Twin Crisis Indicator (Itwin) 
 
The explanatory variables and the indicat
1990 1995 2000 2005
-10
-5 
0 
5 
10
15 itwin 
 203
Ali Arı & Rüstem Dağtekin 
Table
iables Definitions 
 1: Variables of the Models 
Var
CA Current Account (in million TL) 
TRADE Trade Balance = EXPORT–IMPORT (in million TL) 
EXPORT Volume of Export (in million TL) 
IMPORT Volume of Import (in million TL) 
GDP on TL) Gross Domestic Product (in milli
RES Total International Reserves–Gold (in million TL) 
SHORTDEBT Short-term Debt (in million TL) 
EXDEBT Foreign Debt (in million TL) 
PORTEF Portfolio Investments (in million TL) 
ISE Istanbul Stock Exchange Index  
BUDG Net Budgetary Position (in million TL) 
PSBR Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (in million TL) 
CRED Domestic Credit (in million TL) 
M2 Monetary Aggregate = Money+Quasi-Money (in million 
TL) 
OUVCOM rade Degree of Opening to the International T
[(EXPORT+IMPORT)/2]/GDP 
TOT Terms of Trade = Unit Value of Export/Unit Value of 
Import 
IBANK Interbank Interest Rate 
BANKRES in million TL) Banking Sector Reserves Stock (
BANKASSETS Banking Sector Total Assets (in million TL) 
BANKLIAB  Sector Total Liabilities (in million TL) Banking
BCCRED he Banking Sector (in million TL) Central Bank Credits to t
 
After defining e models, we 
will e dev ive consists 
firs  testing if 
we ob a mean reverting trend the so-called variables will be 
station
 the crisis index and the indicators of th
 present th elopment of the crisis models. Our object
t of all in  the stationnarity of the variables. We assume that 
serve 
ary. We make a unit root test (Augmented Dikkey Fuller) to judge 
the stationnarity of the variables. We can see that some variables are not 
stationary at all whereas others do not present any stationnarity at level, 
in which cases they will be excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 2: Early Warning Indicators and Their Awaited Impact on 
the Crisis Index 
Early 
indicator
Notations  Awaited impact on the crisis index  
warning 
s  
Current 
i ce 
 
CA/GDP A country which permanently records a current 
e capital 
i onfidence 
towards the country. If the operators evaluate that 
mbalan account deficit can only finance it with th
nflows, in other words with operators’ c
the unsustainability of the current account deficit is 
high, the country becomes insolvent, which tends to 
increase the probability of a crisis. 
Impact of 
financial 
liberalization 
PORTEF/GDP 
 
 
 
 
E 
 
 
 
IS
An acceleration of the short-term capital inflows 
often under the form of portfolio investments makes 
the country vulnerable to shocks when a massive 
reversal of capitals occurs. An increase of this ratio 
can thus increase the crisis risks for the country if 
the operators lose their confidence towards domestic 
currency.  
-The collapse of the stock exchange index, which 
shows a massive withdrawal of capitals, can be 
perceived as a harbinger of the crisis. 
Debt SHORTDEBT/ 
ES R
A high ratio of the short-term debt to the 
international reserves increases the risk of illiquidity 
and thus the vulnerability of a country to a 
speculative attack. 
Budget
imbala
ary 
nce 
 
 
 
SBR/GDP 
BUDG/GDP 
 
 
 
 
P
The markets often consider a budgetary deficit as a 
source of imbalance as it reduces the available 
national savings and can lead to high inflation rates 
or to a rise of the interest rates. The crisis index 
should increase following a deterioration of the 
budgetary balance. 
A high public sector borrowing requirement can 
increase the interest rates in the domestic markets, 
thus the banking sector can choose to compensate 
for this excessive demand without any risk of return 
instead of granting credits to the private sector. This 
situation decreases investments in the domestic 
economy and leads to economic recession. The crisis 
index should react to the rise of this ratio.  
Monetary 
imbalance 
 
M2/RES 
 
 
 
 
RED/GDP 
 
 
C
 
An economy will be all the more vulnerable to a 
confidence crisis as the ratio of money supply to the 
international reserves is high. This ratio enables to 
measure the capacity for a central bank to face a 
collapse of the reserves in case of loss of the agents’ 
confidence. 
A steady growth of the domestic credit higher than 
the economic growth can be considered as a sign of 
lax monetary policy, likely to lead to a speeding up 
of the inflation or a speculative bubble on the stock 
exchange securities. The crisis index should thus 
react to a rise of this ratio. 
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Table 2: Ea y Warning 
the Crisis Inde
Early Notations   crisis index  
rl Indicators and Their Awaited Impact on 
x (continued) 
Awaited impact on the
warning 
indicators  
Degree of 
opening   
commercial opening is generally 
perceived as a positive factor of long-term growth 
try to an 
external imbalance. 
OUVCOM A high degree of 
but increases the vulnerability of a coun
I TOT A country will be all the more vulnerable to a nternational 
shocks 
 
 variation of its terms of trade as it is strongly open 
to international trade. For instance, an increase of 
the real oil price makes, theoretically, that the 
importing countries record a deterioration of their 
trade balance. 
Financial 
agility 
ANK 
 
 
BANKRES/ 
BANKASSETS 
fr
IB
 
 
 
BCCRED/ 
BANKLIAB 
The sudden and/or continuous rise of the interbank 
interest rate gives an idea of the vulnerability of the 
banking sector. 
This ratio shows the ability of the banking system to 
face the bank runs. A fall of this ratio is perceived by 
the operators as a sign of weakness of the banking 
sector. 
This ratio presents the share of the central bank 
loans in the banking sector liabilities (bailing out by 
the central bank). An increase of this ratio 
represents the illiquidity of the banking system. 
Source: Cartapanis et al. (1998, 2002), Abia
We un step
maximum of variables in hose 
analyt
d (2003), completed by the authors. 
wise regression which consists in integrating a 
the analysis in order to extract firstly t
dertake a 
having a colinearity with another variable, and secondly, those having a 
negligible significance. Some variables, being integral part of the 
ical context of the crisis have not been integrated in the model, 
because they present multicolinierarity. Admittedly the principle of the 
forecasting models is that they analyze the crises case by case. Indeed, 
some variables can be significant for a country but not necessarily for 
another one, even if they are part of a homogeneous economic panel, 
which confirms in other sense our unique country approach applied here 
to the Turkish crisis came out in 2000-2001.  
We successively estimate the equation systems with 4, 3, 2, 1 then 
0 delays (respectively system 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) with the Johansen process 
(1995).  
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The AIC information criteria (Akaike criterion), HQ information 
criteria (Hannan-Quinn), and SC information criteria (Swartz criterion)8 
will enable us to distinguish the number of most significant delays 
according to the simplifications brought to the model. A decrease of the 
information criteria value corresponds to an improvement. According to 
the results, we can privilege the system 5 which corresponds to the 
model with one delay on the explanatory variables. In order to validate 
our model, we use other statistics of diagnostics such as the normality 
and the heteroscedasticity tests. We can find a more suitable description 
of the reference tests in Hendry and Doornik (1997). However we can 
affirm that our modelling is quite robust according to the Table 4. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Indicator  Average Sigma 
Itwin 0.33680 2.7377 
EXPORT ; growth rate 0.0092144 0.15794 
TRADE  -7.3219e+008 4.5530e+008 
CA/GDP 89667 0.031787 
PORTEF/GDP -3.3825 6.5048 
ISE ; growth rate 4504.8 6244.8 
SHORTDEBT/RES ; level 0.55679 0.72352 
SHORTDEBT/RES ; growth rate 0.027721 0.11590 
EXTDEBT/EXPORT  44.172 8.0844 
BUDG/GDP -94.505 101.48 
PSBR 0.040719  0.17147
PSBR/GDP 0.40715 0.19905 
M2/RES ; level 2.2153 3.2447 
M2/RES ; growth rate 0 2 0.03124 0.08487
CRED ; growth rate 010 +010 4.0388e+ 6.6307e
CRED/GDP 1.1942 0.58830 
GDP ; growth rate 010 010 2.1873e+ 3.4224e+
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION ; growth rate 85.788 16.459 
OUVCOM 18.037 33.239 
TOT 0.65241 0.11599 
IBANK 64.323 42.302 
CPS/GDP 0.63467 0.17100 
DEPO/M2 ; level 0.90595 0 0.03220
DEPO/M2 ; growth rate 620 6 0.00043 0.01051
SHORTPOSITION -8.0087e+008 009 4.2228e+
CPS/DEPO 73 1 -0.00227 0.04282
                                                 
8 ( ) ( ) 
T
Tlogk²log += σSC , ( ) ( )
T
 T loglog2k ²log += σHQ  
( )
kT
kTFPE −
+= ²σ , ( )
T
2²log kAIC += σ  
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T escriptive Statistics of theable 3: D  Variables (continued) 
Indicator  Average Sigma 
BANKRES/BANKASSETS 0.049185 0.049185 
BANKASSETS/GDP ; level 1.3256 0.50717 
BANKASSETS/GDP ; growth rate 0.0017882 0.16141 
BCCRED/BANKLIAB 0.033607 0.030709 
After specifying a quite satisfyi model, our 
e  a binary regress l (logit eshold 
to isis state (0) t risis-stat  
period to another was chosen according to the crisis literature where the 
th used go from 1.5 dard . This 
method is completely arbitrary, but it also depends on the level of the 
indica
ng OLS  we test 
xplanatory variables in ion mode ). The thr
 pass from the non-cr o the c e (1) from one
resholds usually to 5 stan deviations
tors and thus on the volatility or fragility of a country to face 
external shocks. To understand the reality of the Turkish crisis, we tested 
the thresholds of 6, 7, 8, 9 and even 10 standard deviations as we can 
see in some empirical studies, in particular in Vlaar (2000). This solution 
was considered and tested but not adopted for an arbitrary rule which 
consists in placing the threshold in the state of crisis at the average of 2 
standard deviations. 
σ
σ
2 if 0
2 if 1
<=
≥=
ITwinITwin
ITwinITwin
    (6) 
Table 4: Tests 
AIC  2.68675 
HQ 2.92828 
SC 3.28445 
FPE 14.7399 
AR 1-7 test F(7,169)   =   1.9416 [0.0659] 
hetero test  =   1.3439 [0.0836] F(74,101)
log-likelihood -249.483 
Durbin Watson  2.19 
Number of parameter 38 
Number of observation  215 
ESTIMAT
 the results of gressions, we can see that our 
cr aithful to lity and it confirms the occurrence 
of and in ary 2001 (see Figure 5 and Table 
6). Our explanatory variables seem to be chosen in a satisfactory way. 
However some of our DP) and would have 
biased our analysis if we had not created the time dummies.  
ION RESULTS 
According to  our re
isis indicator is rather f  rea
 the crises in April 1994 Febru
 variables are seasonal (G
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Figure 5: Crisis Indicator (Itwin and Itwin fitted) 
Table 5: Twin Crisis Index Values 
Period Itwin 
Value 
Period Itwin 
Value 
Period Itwin 
Value 
Period Itwin 
Value 
1987M1 -1,18 1991M6 4,49 1995M11 4,46 2000M4 1,83 
1987M2 -1,18 1991M7 1,58 1995M12 10,04 2000M5 3,92 
1987M3 3,78 1991M8 2,94 1996M1 1,32 2000M6 4,30 
1987M4 2,72 1991M9 4,10 1996M2 4,81 2000M7 2,34 
1987M5 1,18 1991M10 2,15 1996M3 6,12 2000M8 4,16 
1987M6 3,55 1991M11 3,41 1996M4 3,23 2000M9 2,71 
1987M7 -0,98 1991M12 6,49 1996M5 3,60 2000M10 0,54 
1987M8 3,93 1992M1 0,22 1996M6 6,07 2000M11 1,57 
1987M9 3,78 1992M2 3,43 1996M7 3,91 2000M12 6,55 
1987M10 2,38 1992M3 3,19 1996M8 3,87 2001M1 -3,91 
 
1990 1995 2000
0 
10
20 I_TWIN Fitted 
2005
3 
1990 1995 2000 2005
-1 
0 
1 
r:I_TWIN (scaled) 
2 
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T T ri x es ue
Value Value 
I
Value Value 
able 5: win C sis Inde  Valu  (contin d) 
Period Itwin Period Itwin Period twin Period Itwin 
1987M11 3,11 1992M4 3,47 1996M9 7,33 2001M2 17,09 
1987M12 7,86 1992M5 4,93 1996M10 5,24 2001M3 3,15 
1988M1 0,47 1992M6 6,03 1996M11 4,97 2001M4 6,30 
1988M2 4,81 1992M7 6,78 1996M12 10,00 2001M5 -0,89 
1988M3 3,08 1992M8 2,66 1997M1 1,09 2001M6 3,78 
1988M4 2,15 1992M9 1,51 1997M2 2001M73,94 3,27 
1988M5 2,00 1992M10 4,17 1997M3 4,80 2001M8 5,28 
1988M6 2,32 1992M11 2,03 1997M4 3,04 2001M9 5,43 
1988M7 3,19 1992M12 8,06 1997M5 4,13 2001M10 2,87 
1988M8 3,59 1993M1 3,27 1997M6 6,54 2001M11 -6,43 
1988M9 4,28 1993M2 4,19 1997M7 4,69 2001M12 0,33 
1988M10 7,89 1993M3 3,54 1997M8 4,88 2002M1 -7,57 
1988M11 1,71 1993M4 3,17 1997M9 6,07 2002M2 5,53 
1988M12 4,08 1993M5 4,16 1997M10 4,35 2002M3 -1,55 
1989M1 1,07 1993M6 2,14 1997M11 2,98 2002M4 0,72 
1989M2 1,96 1993M7 4,98 1997M12 7,61 2002M5 2,86 
1989M3 2,34 1993M8 3,56 1998M1 1,79 2002M6 7,06 
1989M4 1,35 1993M9 1,99 1998M2 4,15 2002M7 7,02 
1989M5 0,03 1993M10 6,06 1998M3 7,39 2002M8 -1,21 
1989M6 3,76 1993M11 2,64 1998M4 4,76 2002M9 0,77 
1989M7 3,46 1993M12 3,36 1998M5 3,58 2002M10 1,21 
1989M8 2,52 1994M1 7,26 1998M6 5,80 2002M11 -3,55 
1989M9 2,79 1994M2 5,17 1998M7 1,54 2002M12 5,22 
1989M10 4,19 1994M3 7,44 1998M8 0,84 2003M1 1,78 
1989M11 4,84 1994M4 17,31 1998M9 2,99 2003M2 -1,95 
1989M12 3,14 1994M5 -2,30 1998M10 -1,58 2003M3 3,42 
1990M1 1,62 1994M6 -1,06 1998M11 2,60 2003M4 -2,24 
1990M2 3,70 1994M7 4,06 1998M12 5,38 2003M5 -4,28 
1990M3 1,86 1994M8 6,80 1999M1 1,25 2003M6 -0,44 
1990M4 2,63 1994M9 3,49 1999M2 3,37 2003M7 0,62 
1990M5 1,96 1994M10 2,77 1999M3 5,70 2003M8 -0,27 
1990M6 5,49 1994M11 1,76 1999M4 3,44 2003M9 3,19 
1990M7 3,47 1994M12 8,13 1999M5 3,38 2003M10 4,25 
1990M8 2,07 1995M1 6,88 1999M6 3,77 2003M11 1,09 
1990M9 1,79 1995M2 4,70 1999M7 2,65 2003M12 2,75 
1990M10 2,23 1995M3 5,04 1999M8 2,47 2004M1 -2,89 
1990M11 2,12 1995M4 4,22 1999M9 4,59 2004M2 -0,09 
1990M12 4,18 1995M5 1,61 1999M10 1,77 2004M3 1,13 
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T T ri x es ueable 5: win C sis Inde  Valu  (contin d) 
1991M1 -1,91 1995M6 3,92 1999M11 4,16 2004M4 5,21 
1991M2 1,71 1995M7 4,82 1999M12 7,03 2004M5 5,98 
1991M3 6,32 1995M8 4,57 2000M1 -1,80 2004M6 1,41 
1991M4 3,15 1995M9 3,87 2000M2 3,42 2004M7 -1,86 
1991M5 3,87 1995M10 3,82 2000M3 2,68 2004M8 3,95 
The ie th g g c thered in 
the below t . T e l y e ad o 
reduce the be riables so  r y e 
c ts city and of course ac f t ef ig
Tab
coeffic nts and eir de rees of si nifican e are ga
ables he math matica complexit  of th study le s us t
 num r of va  as not to alte  accurac of th
oefficien  elasti curacy o he co ficients s ns.  
le 6: Model I (OLS) Estimates 
Indicator  Coeff. T-stat 
CA/GDP 6.93501*** 1.29 (5.372) 
PORTEF/GDP 0.0316210*   0.522 (0.06052) 
ISE 0.000233172*** 2.69 (8.676e-05) 
SHORTDEBT/RES ; level 5.83497*** 8.34 (0.6996) 
BUDG/GDP -0.00557158*** -2.89 (-2.89) 
PSBR/GDP 8.24629** 2.12 346) (1.
M2/RES ; level  0.494364*** 0.569 (0.3296) 
CRED/GDP -2.69920**   -1.27 (2.129)  
OUVCOM 0.00651498* 0.694 (0.009387) 
TOT 0.0040756* 1.68 (0.001694) 
IBANK 0.330357*** 19.8 (0.001667) 
BANKRES/BANKASSETS 3.78043*** 2.10 (1.797) 
BCCRED/BANKLIAB 6.45613 ** 3.52 (5.646) 
*  
*  5% 
*** Threshold of 10% 
T t) Es
 Threshold of 1%
* Threshold of
able 7 : Model II (Logi timates 
Indicator Coeff. T-stat 
CA/GDP; growth rate 30.4911 0.923 (33.03) 
PORTEF/GDP; growth rate 6.15745e-005 3.26 (1836) 
SHORTDEBT/RES ; growth rate 4.76282 1.45 (3.291) 
PSBR/GDP; growth rate 56.6321 2.10 (27.00) 
M2/RES ; growth rate -20.9880 -8.04 (2.612) 
CRED/GDP ; growth rate 15.9573 1.73 (9.237) 
IBANK ; level 0.0673785 6.76 (0.02141) 
BANKRES/BANKASSESTS ; growth rate -35.6818 -2.21 (16.13) 
BCCRED/BANKLIAB; growth rate ) -84.4943 -155 (0.5434
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s the occurrenc sis actu d in 
40 lso foresees the a  a cris the 
ca e reaches only 3% (occurrenc lled 
cr ver occurred). But the  limit e 
model does not manage to signal 60% o s whic the 
Tu
Table
 
Our model foresee e of a cri ally appeare
% of the cases. It a bsence of is in 97% of 
ses whereas the failur e of a signa
isis which ne forecast is ed because th
f the crise h occurred in 
rkish economy. 
 8: Forecast Assessment according to Binary Regression 
Model 
 Non-crisis foreseen 
by the model 
Crisis foreseen by 
the model 
Total 
Non-crisis  96.744 3.256 100% 
Crisis 60 40 100% 
 Non-crisis foreseen 
by
Crisis foreseen by Total 
 the model the model 
Non-crisis  208 2 210 
Crisis 3 2 5 
The liber of the Turkish y plays a major role in the 
occurrence of t urkish crisis; becau he current imbalanc tor 
CA/GDP is quit  the 
current account anced b l inflows, but when the 
o  confidence towards th ountry, we observe brupt 
increase favourable for a crisis state. e trap of liberalizatio an only 
be avoided if a country has beforehand acquired stable economic 
fundam
lead to a self-fulfilling spiral which completes the 
seque
alization  econom
he T se t e indica
e significant. The indic
 deficits are fin
ator of crisis decreases
y the capita
 when
perators lose e c  an a
Th n c
entals. 
The financial liberalization, represented here by PORTEF/GDP and 
ISE, is another important factor in the outbreak of the crisis. The massive 
capital inflows and then their sudden withdrawal create an uncontrollable 
volatility. That situation generates a movement of widespread distrust 
which can lead to a panic and thus weaken the macroeconomic 
fundamentals whereas early warning signals are not so obvious. These 
misalignments 
nce by an advanced crisis state. This is why our dependant variable 
is mainly explained by some basic variables as CA/GDP, SHORTDEBT/RES 
and M2/RES. Nevertheless, the Istanbul Stock Exchange index indicator 
ISE is not significant, whereas we observe a sharp fall on the Figure 6. 
So, the removal of that indicator from the analysis increases the 
robustness of the model. 
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Figure 6: The Istanbul Stock Exchange Index 
Our debt indicator SHORTDEBT/RES (short-term debt to 
international reserves) is also significant. This ratio that reaches more 
than 
country to the GDP, is not significant. It can be explained 
by imp
, present 
an imp
1.50 just before the crisis explains the important risk of a 
speculative attack and the increasing vulnerability of the country to a 
liquidity crisis. 
However, the BUDG/GDP indicator, representing the net budgetary 
position of the 
lementation of the stabilization program at the beginning of 2000 
which foresaw a restrictive budgetary policy in order to limit public 
expenditure and thus to decrease the inflation rate. Besides, the primary 
balance surplus reached approximately 6% at the end of the year 2000. 
Nonetheless, the PSBR/GDP indicator, which represents the public sector 
borrowing requirement to the GDP, is quite significant. That is due to the 
bailing out of the illiquid banks by the Treasury and the Central Bank of 
Turkey following the banking liquidity crisis of November 2000.  
The M2/RES and CRED/GDP indicators, which represent the impact 
of monetary imbalance on the occurrence of the Turkish crisis
ortant aspect. The non-sterilization of the excessive capital inflows 
in the Turkish money market throughout the year 2000 by the monetary 
authorities involved a sharp rise of money supply and thus an increase of 
the domestic credit volume. The deterioration of the quality of the credit, 
which added to the loss of international reserves (struggle in order to 
maintain the parity of the fixed exchange rate), induced a negative effect 
on the crisis index. The explosion of credit also influenced in an indirect 
and negative way the disinflation policy by increasing domestic 
consumption and deteriorating trade balance. Because of that, this 
variable is one of the most influent on the crisis index in absolute value. 
1990 1995 2000
20000 
17500 
15000 
12500 
10000 
7500
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2500
22500 ISE 
2005
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rnational 
trade) and TOT (terms of trade) do not have a significant effect on the 
crisis 
vulnerability, IBANK, BANKRES/BANKASSETS and 
BCCRE
 
 
Figure 7: Short-term Debt to the International Reserves 
The indicators OUVCOM (degree of opening to the inte
index, which shows that the shock was not external, but internal 
due to the political instability and the fragility of the Turkish banking 
system. 
As we show in Tables 5 and 6, all the indicators of the banking 
sector 
D/BANKLIAB are significant. In particular the interbank interest 
rate which reaches more than 400% just before the crisis (see Figure 2) 
and the Central Bank credits to the banking system which records a 
sharp rise following the bailing out of the illiquid banks (see Figure 8) 
have a significant impact on the crisis index. The BANKRES/BANKASSETS 
indicator which shows the capital adequacy is also quite significant. The 
Turkish banking system which did not have an effective control 
mechanism until the establishment of the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency in September 2000, did not respect the prudential 
ratios like the ratio Cooke. 
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0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
SHORTDEBT/RES 
2.00
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Figure 8: The Central Bank Credits in the Banks Liabilities 
CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to examine the explanatory capacity of some 
variables to predict the 2000/2001 Turkish crisis. As we showed in the 
previous section, the models illustrate well the Turkish reality and the 
crisis periods. The variables seem also to be chosen in a satisfactory way. 
The 2000/2001 Turkish crisis was influenced especially by the banking 
sector fragility indicators and variables of the current and monetary 
imbalances. 
We see that the characteristic of the 2000/2001 Turkish financial 
crisis is not only its violence but also its suddenness. We observe two 
rapid crisis sequences which are different from recent financial crisis 
examples where we could observe that the crisis countries did have 
peaks which remained in the crisis state (state 1) during several months; 
it was not valid for the Turkey which exited very fast from the crisis 
state. However, our analysis is a little biased by the IMF credit injections. 
It would be interesting to analyse the real impact of this crisis by 
withdrawing the IMF credits from the State’s accounts. We can claim that 
the international lender of last resort fully functioned for the 2000/2001 
Turkish crisis. Undoubtedly without IMF credits the negative effects of 
the crisis would be visible several months as we observed in the 2001 
Argentinean crisis. 
Why then did the crisis hit in February 2001 but not in another 
period? We explain it by the rumours of political instability that led to an 
excessive reaction of the operators and by the excessive risk taking of 
the banking sector. We thus claim that without the banking sector 
fragility, the 2001 Turkish crisis would never have occurred. In the 
Turkish financial crisis, the banking crisis and the currency crisis occurred 
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almost at the same time, with an interval of two months. The Turkish 
crisis is well a twin crisis a la Kaminsky and Reinhart where the banking 
crisis is followed by a currency crisis which, in its turn, deepened the 
banking crisis. 
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